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This book is not an introductory text. It presumes some 
philosophical background and interest in reasoned thought. I have 
written it as I approach my “retirement years,” as it were, and thus 
it does not contain reference to the latest scholars who may be 
writing on this topic. I have reverted, for my own ease of memory, 
to names with which I was made familiar in my formative 
philosophical years. 
 
My contention for many years has been that theological problems 
are first and, primarily, philosophical problems and need to be 
solved as such. To my mind, Dr. Leslie Dewart’s understanding of 
“dehellenization,” not to be confused with “unhellenization,” 
provides a philosophical opportunity for fresh reflection on our 
inherited classical understanding which presents contemporary 
problems for theologians. I have attempted such reflection in these 
pages. I leave it to the reader to decide whether or not my reflections 
have clarified the issues or clouded them. 
 
It is unfortunate, at this time in the development of ideas that the 
place of philosophy in relation to theology seems to have been 
usurped, to a great degree, by sociology and psychology. I am 
sure that contemporary theologians are the poorer for it. That having 
been said, it is my hope that those readers who are not 
philosophically inclined, should they persevere with this book, will 
uncover insights not previously known. 
 
A remark about my understanding of a “scientific philosophy” is in 
order. Science, (not to be confused with technology) and philosophy 
are not mutually exclusive. A scientific philosophy is a reasoned 
philosophy, yet not necessarily rooted in Greek classical thought. It 













DEWART’S APPROACH TO DEHELLENIZATION 
 
Introducing Dr Dewart 
 
The entry in Contemporary Authors for Dr Leslie Dewart, who 
began his academic career at the University of Toronto in 1954, 
reads as follows: 
Late in 1969 an investigation by the Vatican 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith was 
convened to examine the theological implications 
of Dewart’s writings. The investigation was 
generated by the publication of The Future of 
Belief, and, although no condemnation was issued, 
it was reported that the Congregation asked Dewart 
not to authorize further editions of the book, a 
request which the author refused. Dewart also 
declined to defend his book or his orthodoxy, 
stating that ‘to have struck any such defensive 
posture would have implicitly granted the 
legitimacy of the Congregation as a tribunal at 
whose bar transgressions of the bounds of 
legitimate speculation may be tried.’ Dewart has 
continued to write about his own interpretation of 
Christianity in the contemporary world and to 
delineate what he believes are needed reforms in 
the Catholic Church. 1 
It continues to be to my benefit that I was taught, as an 
undergraduate student of philosophy, by Dr Dewart at the 




He introduced his students to phenomenological philosophy, an 
alternative to scholastic philosophy, used to interpret Catholic 
theology. In my book, A Phenomenological Understanding of 
Certain Liturgical Texts, I acknowledged that he taught me how to 
think outside Hellenist categories and yet remain faithful to what 
truth they so admirably express. 2 He has consistently worked at 
developing an alternative way to the Hellenist tradition of thinking 
beginning with his first book in1963. Although, he was teaching 
in a Catholic university, (St Michael’s College), he did not restrict 
the application of his thought to Roman Catholicism. 3 Since the 
reader of this book may not be familiar with Dr Dewart’s books, or 
his attempt at dehellenization, by way of introduction I provide an 
edited précis and brief exposé of his major works. In presenting this 
précis and exposé, I have isolated Dr Dewart’s seminal thoughts on 
dehellenization and have attempted to present a faithful 
understanding of his initial insights. Dr Dewart’s books, like all 
his writing, do not make for light reading. Truly, one needs to make 
an effort to understand the essence of his thinking. Gregory Nixon 
has acknowledged this requirement in his review of Dewart’s 
Evolution and Consciousness as one reason for the book’s limited 
exposure. “In my view, such wide reading never took place because 
of bad marketing and because, like all great philosophy, it is a 
damned demanding tome. This is a work of high philosophy 
indeed by one of our major intellects who sees clearly and 
unsparingly and truthfully.” 4 Leslie Dewart’s style demands that 
the reader follows critically his arguments through to their 
conclusions. I can attest that this task will be richly rewarding for 
anyone taking the time and making the effort to do so. The 
presentation of his books, chronologically ordered, broadly 
illustrates the development of the theme of dehellenization, as I have 
understood it, unfolding through the stages of his writing career. 
Dehellenization, as a philosophical concept, is the conscious 
creation of a human world that does not yet exist. It does not mean 
the undoing of the world formerly accepted but, rather, the creation 
of a new world based on the world that does exist. Dehellenization 




It is an existential stance, or attitude, that one consciously takes, with 
effort, within his or her worldly environment. I hope to show that 
this theme of dehellenization and its development is paramount in 
all of Dr Dewart’s books, (and his articles for that matter), although 
























Christianity and Revolution: The Lesson of Cuba (1963) 
 
The first of Leslie Dewart’s books, Christianity and Revolution: The 
Lesson of Cuba, is actually an essay in political philosophy about 
the relationship between the Church and State. Using the Cuban 
political context to make his point he demonstrates that the 
integration of the Christian philosophical order and the humanist, 
(not humanitarian), philosophical order had developed to the point 
that to distinguish between the two became an almost impossible 
task. In pre-revolutionary Cuba it was easy to believe that to be a 
Christian was the same as to be a supporter of and to preserve the 
existing political state of affairs. From a theological perspective, the 
lesson to be learned in the Cuban experience, he believes, is not so 
much that the faithful may reject the Church as relevant to their 
lives but, more significantly, that the Church may not remain 
spiritually relevant to the faithful. It was within this insight and 
understanding that he wrote, Christianity and Revolution: The 
Lesson of Cuba, pointing out that Christians, and not just Cuban 
Christians, ought to recognize that they are in a crisis and 
approaching the end of a spiritual and political age. 
 
One indication of the philosophical crisis underlying the political 
experience is that we cannot come to know something of human 
relationships without becoming different ourselves. Gaining 
knowledge is a transforming activity and therefore constitutes a 
readjustment to our environment and its institutions. Our political 
institutions, civic and ecclesiastical, do make allowances on the 
basis of their past experience and adjust themselves to changed 
environmental circumstances. But they do so at an obsolete rate of 
development. Contemporary Christian witness is not likely to be 
heard because of an a priori and uncritical understanding on the 
part of the believer. When answers to our questions, which arise 
from experience and rules of behaviour based on political 
expediency, are supplied to us beforehand we need seek no other 
option in interpreting our experience. We may have long misused 




correct the past. Our problem is how to plan for the future. Our 
problem is dehellenization. For many of us the fast-paced, 
multifaceted modern world may be distant and largely unknown. 
However, it can never be an alien world, or a non-human one. In 
short, the world is not a foreign land but rather it is our home. 
 
Christian belief, which is based on a religious philosophy, is 
neither an abstraction nor an idea. It is not even an ideology. The 
substance of Christian belief is an existential, historical reality, 
concretely experienced. It is a historical reality not only in our 
psychological, social, and natural experience but also in our 
transcendent, spiritual, and supernatural experience. To believe in 
the Judeao-Christian revelation is to believe that we exist in a certain 
historical condition definable by certain events. It is important to 
recognize that all these events, having taken place within history 
might have been otherwise. 
 
It is true that we experience society and our environment as more 
than the sum of their parts, Dewart acknowledges. However, we 
have not yet managed to devise a theory to explain the nature of the 
integration of that part known as Greek philosophy into our 
contemporary experience of society and our environment. Two 
questions underlie all problems raised within our experience. One is 
philosophical and   the other theological. The inordinate influence 
of Greek philosophy on the Christian conception of the human being 
has determined the concept of human freedom which may be more 
or less deficient regarding the individual human person, but which 
is totally deficient regarding society and history. As contemporary 
Western thinkers we believe in human freedom. But, like the 
Greeks, philosophically we assume the determination of society and 
of history. This is why we have not really solved the problems of 
the individual and society and of personal responsibility and our 
historical condition. The suggestion made here is that both society 
and history, being human, are just as free in their development as 
the individual is. Further, society, history and the individual are free 




freedom should be essentially predicable of both society and history. 
 
If the speculative enquiry of the philosopher into practical, human 
affairs has any meaning and Christian value it is because as 
Christian philosophers we are trying to work out with our 
intellects, creatively and faithfully, a plan by which to live in the 
freedom in which we have been created. This includes the 
supernatural vocation to which we have been called by God. The 
Greeks, in order to carry out their plan needed to presuppose in their 
philosophy “ideas” to which citizens were conformed. Modern 
philosophers believe, instead, in human freedom, individual, 
collective and historical. The proposition questioned here is that 
there is such a Hellenist ideal. When we enquire about that we 
should do if we are to do the right thing, we enquire about what 
we have to do to bring into existence what does not yet exist. 
 
From Dr Dewart’s point of view the lesson of Cuba is that we are 
truly responsible for our conduct, and no one else is. Further, no one 
can do away with our moral freedom. Only we ourselves can 
surrender it. The political order, thus, must be grounded on our 
social and historical freedom. Spiritually, as well as politically, we 
cannot avoid ruling ourselves except reasonably, humanely, and 
autonomously. We are not to do as Plato and Aristotle did, that is, 
attempt to figure out the riddle of a preconceived order, whether 
social, political, economic, or personal. 
 
Christian thought and practice have alternated between identifying 
with and separating from the Church and world. The best 
compromise that we have developed to date is that of distinguishing 
between the Church and the world without either separating or 
uniting them. The time has come for Christianity to create its own 
cultural forms. There is no material out of which to create the 
Christian cultural forms of the future, except that of our past and 
our history. This is a good reason for Christianity’s participation in 
the public life. The Church’s basic relation to cultural forms of 




cultural forms. In this book Dr Dewart sets out his initial reflections 
that will form the basis of the phenomenological and existential 





































The Future of Belief: Theism in a World Come of Age (1966) 
 
Theism and Consciousness 
 
Contemporary experience should be understood as the mode of 
consciousness that we have reached as a result of our historical and 
evolutionary development according to Dr Dewart. Ultimately, we 
may have to live with divergent conscious conceptualizations of the 
God of Christian belief. Our mode of consciousness involves the 
development of some form of alternative understanding to our 
present understanding. What we make ourselves to be places us in a 
certain existential relation to God. Our purposiveness which is our 
intention as determined internally, (Dewart does not mean our 
purpose, which is our intention as determined externally), resides in 
our seeking creatively, not to be happy, but simply, to be. 
 
Our present self-creation takes place in the presence of God as God’s 
self-communication to us. For the anti-theist God is, if nothing else, 
thinkable. For the a-theist God is not. Faith is the existential 
response of the self to the openness of a perceived transcendent 
disclosed by conscious experience. We cannot believe in God once-
for-all any more than we can exist once-for- all. Christianity is the 
only religion to have generated religious atheism within itself. 
Atheism, as a cultural phenomenon, is indigenous to Christian 
societies. None, but the Christian cultures, have ever generated 
atheism, and it is difficult to suppose that any others could have done 
so. 
 
The post-facto awareness of one’s personal, hence, historical 
development is not peculiar to Christianity. It is a property of our 
human nature. Our awareness of the fact that we develop historically 
must in some sense find its explanation in the nature of human 
consciousness. Our contemporary psychic life is distinguished from  
animal psychic life in a much more radical manner than in the 
philosophical tradition that runs from early Greece to early modern 




humanity’s psychic life exhibits a peculiar character that animals do 
not appear to share even in part. Unlike animals, we are beings who 
are present to ourselves. This presence of our being to ourselves is 
called consciousness. We, and animals both “know,” but the real 
difference between the “types of knowledge” is not of a higher 
degree for us. The real difference between humanity and animals 
transcends the order of mere knowledge altogether. This means: we 
can know not only beings, but also be-ing; not only being-as-other, 
but also being- itself. 
 
The basic characteristic of human existence is sometimes called 
transcendence. The typical form of human development is an 
increase in consciousness in a philosophical sense. The 
distinctiveness of this development, over learning properly so- 
called, is that it cannot take the form of a quantitative increase. 
An increase in consciousness develops as we become increasingly 
aware of that which, in a sense, we already were conscious of. This 
means that to heighten one’s consciousness is to “realize” that 
which had been “before our eyes” all the time and which, indeed, 
we had already seen, but which we now see all over again “in a 
new light”, that is, with a sharper, clearer, heightened or nobler 
meaning. This new meaning is not a substitute for the earlier one. It 
is transcendent meaning. It is possible only insofar as it emerges 
from the earlier one that it incorporates to itself and thus brings itself 
into a “fuller” and “richer” experience. The heightening of 
consciousness, or realizing a nobler meaning, presupposes a genuine 
but more primitive consciousness. Heightening of consciousness can 
only grow out of a primitive consciousness and it is meaningful 
only in relation to it. Consciousness is not an essentially and 
originally private event that is afterwards communicated, (through 
signs), to other human beings. Its essential privacy and its originally 
personal nature are strictly related to its essentially public and 
originally social and historical nature. Conceptualization is the 
socio-historical process by which our consciousness and ourselves 
evolve. Our present history is an ex-animal one. It is the 






Our psychic life is not the mind’s union with a reality from which it 
was originally separated by its substantive self-containment. Our 
psychic life is the mind’s self-differentiation of its-self out of a 
reality with which it was originally continuous and united in un-
differentiation. Consciousness is a process whereby our being 
emerges. Consciousness is not the becoming of a being. 
Consciousness is the coming-into-being of the mind and soul. Thus, 
there is no real difference between consciousness and self- 
consciousness. 
 
All consciousness bears directly upon reality; all human 
consciousness is conceptual of something. Self is that which is 
conscious, that which can signify itself to its-self. To be a subject is 
to be an object to oneself. We no longer understand personality in 
relation to Nature, since we do not understand being as a hierarchy 
of perfection and being. Personality is the proper perfection of 
being, consciousness and experience at their present historical stage 
of evolution. Consciousness is the constituent of humanity. It is the 
equivalent of life and existence. A person is a being who knows 
enough to want to go beyond itself. Traditionally, belief must bear 
directly upon the reality of God, not upon words or upon concepts 
about God, this is the corollary to the idea that God reveals himself, 
not words about or concepts of himself. To believe in a concept of 
God is to believe in what we really become cognitively related to 
which is St Thomas’s position. If a Christian looks at the world and 
understands nature through Hellenic eyes, it will be necessary to 
assert the omnipotence of God over and against nature. God does 
not have power over nature. Let us say that nature does not have its 
own natural finalities independently of God’s. The fundamental 
relation between humanity and God consists in the mutual presence 
of God and humanity in conscious creation of the world. As  
Christian theism is dehellenized the Christian faith may recast 
the meaning of religion in terms that do not at all imply God’s 




the adoption of Greek philosophy came the spilt of the ontic 
relations of God and humanity into the metaphysical, which are 
antecedent, and the moral, which are consequent. 
 
Theism and Knowledge 
 
In the Western traditional understanding, to know a thing better 
means to know more things about the same thing. The absence of 
revelation after the close of the New Testament era means the 
faith of Christianity cannot teach any new truths. The Trinity and 
Incarnation were revealed and taught by Christianity in relation to 
Judaism. Once complete, Christianity could only increase by the 
explication of objects as already known as prior objects of faith. We 
should not suppose that the fullness of God’s self- revelation in Jesus 
means that God’s self-revelation ceased at a certain point in time, 
after which we no longer enjoy the revealing presence of God, but 
enjoy only the record of the revelation completed in the past. 
 
Truth is not the adequacy of our representative intellectual 
operations, but the adequacy of our conscious existence. For, the 
truth is the valuable quality that it is only because it is part of the 
process of our self-creation and coming-into-being. Truth can be a 
relation towards being only if it is a fidelity rather than a 
conformity. Conformity is a relation towards another that is owing 
to another by reason of the other’s nature. Fidelity is a relation 
towards another that one owes to oneself by reason of one’s own 
nature. Conformity [like law] obligates from without. Fidelity, like 
nobility, obligates from within. 
 
Concepts are the cultural form of human experience. The 
development of human consciousness means the development of 
concepts and conceptual systems. We develop culturally in order to 
exist. To master the language of contemporary experience is in 
 reality to think in contemporary concepts. To think in new concepts 





faith is a process by which we render ourselves present to that-in-
which-we-believe. In the theory of knowledge suggested here by 
Dewart human knowledge is not the bridging of an original 
isolation but, on the contrary, the self- differentiation of 
consciousness in and through the agent’s objectification of the world 
and itself. An agent’s conceptualization is the socio-historical 
mechanism through which the self-differentiation of consciousness 
can take place. Concepts are not the subjective expression of an 
objective reality. Concepts are the self-expression of consciousness 
and are therefore the means by which we objectify the world and 
the self and the means by which we self-communicate with another 
self (including God). Concepts are the means by which we objectify 
ourselves to another self and by which we objectify ourselves to 
ourselves. 
 
Conscious knowledge is not an intentional union of knower and 
known, of subject and object. Hence the contingency of creatures is 
not to be conceived as a real distinction between essence and 
existence, but as that peculiar quality of their factuality which 
consists in their appearing, their coming-into-being, their sudden 
emergence, as it were, onto the cosmic stage without having been 
previously listed in the program. Humanity’s contingency is the fact 
that in order to be humanity it must create itself. 
 
Gabriel Marcel and Nicolas Berdyaev do not conceive any reality 
as polarized by existence and essence. They are concerned with 
being in its empirical immediacy. They try to avoid every a priori 
construction such as that required us to distinguish between essence 
and existence as constituents of reality as such. For such a 
philosophy would not be concerned with demonstrating that a God 
whom “everyone” knows actually exists, or that God, a possible 
being and an actual object of knowledge, “objectively” exists. Such 
a philosophy would be concerned with showing how God is truly 
present to human experience. Such a philosophy concerns the  
presence and truth of God. Such a God, however, would not be even 




Christian philosophy. Its God would be wholly and exclusively the 
Christian God. 
 
Theism and Personal Presence 
 
A person cannot be a termination of nature. But nature is a 
termination of personality and a person terminates itself and makes 
its nature in and through existing. Christ was essentially the 
redeemer of Israel. The Word (logos) was the restorer of all things 
and all humanity. The person, (as subject), is a center of 
consciousness. A person is that which can objectify itself. A person 
is that which can objectively signify itself to itself by means of its 
(conceptual) self. 
 
In Christian theism intelligibility is a matter of fact, not of necessity. 
For to exist and to be present are quite different things. A reality 
beyond the totality of being reveals itself by its presence. There can 
be, beyond the totality of all actually existing being, something 
present to us in our experience, in the sense that when somebody’s 
presence does really make itself felt it makes me more fully myself 
than I should be if I were not exposed to its impact. Hence, an 
adequate philosophy generates an adequate theology. What needs to 
be “proven” is not that a God-being objectively exists. What 
requires “a demonstration,” for it is not immediately obvious, is 
God’s presence. In what sense, in what way, and with what 
consequences, God is present. 
 
Worship might be better understood as the rendering of our selves 
present to the presence of God, whether in the interior prayer which 
sends no message to God but which receives his presence, or in the 
public and common ceremonies which visibly, audibly and sensibly 
unite us through our collective presence to each other in the presence 
of the present God. The concept of the supernatural is not of itself 
an intrinsic part of the Christian faith. What is absolutely  
fundamental to the Christian experience is that which is 




the Spirit of God is known as the “gift” (donum) of God. 
 
Theism and Dehellenization 
 
The hellenization of Christianity was the gradual transformation of 
an earlier cultural form into a later one, it being assumed that the 
truth of Christianity depended on neither form as such. Hellenism, 
after all, was, though not the cultural form of the whole world 
as we know it today, the cultural form of the ecumenical world. 
Throughout the apostolic and patristic ages it was practically 
impossible to distinguish between the universalization and the 
hellenization of Christianity. In contrast to this culture, in the 
Hebraic culture, God was a transcendent presence. God was a 
reality other than being who is present to being (by which he makes 
being to be). 
 
Reality, as necessarily and exclusively conceivable as being, is an 
illusion. A Christian can equate intelligibility and necessity only as 
long as belief in evolution is rejected. Intelligibility and necessity 
require the adoption of a Hellenic philosophical viewpoint. The 
integration of theism with everyday experience requires a 
dehellenization of dogma and doctrine and specifically that of the 
Christian doctrine of God. Dehellenization may be described as a 
conscious historical self-fashioning of the cultural form which 
Christianity requires now for the sake of its future. In other words, 
dehellenization means the conscious creation of the future of belief. 
 
Christian thinking has modified Greek metaphysics. From the 
Christian perspective, in creatures there is a real distinction between 
essence and existence. Yet, in God there is no distinction between 
essence and existence. The creature/creator relationship was not part 
of the Greek metaphysic. There is therefore, an unbridgeable 
difference between the way God is in se, that is, in himself and the 
way God is in our knowledge. This approach leads logically to either  
the skepticism of unbelievers or the fideism of believers. Perhaps 




Christian philosophy would be that it should begin with a 
consideration of the needs of the Christian faith, not those of Greek 
metaphysics. The obsolescence of Scholasticism goes together with 
that of Christianity’s Hellenic cultural form. 
 
In recent times, as philosophy has diverged more and more from its 
Greek presuppositions, and as nature and essence have ceased to be 
understood as intelligible necessities, the concept of the supernatural 
has lost its usefulness for Christian theism. The mainstream of 
Catholic philosophy has remained Scholastic and hence 
unsympathetic to the contemporary understanding of nature. 
Catholic theology, especially in those circles that have consciously 
abandoned Scholasticism, that is, the Teilhardians, or in those 
specialties that were never dominated by it, that is, scriptural 
studies, has increasingly turned to non-Christian, secular thought for 
philosophical help. 
 
In the alternative view to Hellenized thought, grace continues to be 
what Christian belief always held it was, but nature ceases in every 
way to be opposed to grace. Nature is naturally to receive grace 
because that is how it was in fact created. Since nature is essentially 
contingent, deriving its intelligibility from its factuality and 
historicity, nature is historically, not metaphysically, related to 
grace. Grace is thus understood as a historical fact. God’s presence 
to humanity, which existentially qualifies the historical 
intelligibility of nature, is to be understood alternatively to 
Hellenized thought through a concept of Theism appropriate to the 












The Foundations of Belief (1969) 
 
Belief and Evolution 
 
Will Christianity undertake to direct its own evolution or continue 
to evolve at an obsolete rate and in a pre-conscious mode? In a world 
increasingly characterized by the self- organization of ourselves on 
a global scale, the catholicity of the Catholic faith must seek the 
ultimate religious integration of humanity. Dewart suggests that 
philosophy today must give itself a meta-metaphysical orientation, 
that is to say philosophy should transcend its metaphysical stage of 
development, and thus initiate its meta-metaphysical stage. Since 
everything evolves, the real problem for contemporary humanity 
is not whether the world will change or whether it will remain the 
same. The issue is whether the world will change of its own accord, 
without human management, or whether it will be changed 
deliberately, consciously and with the self-regulation that is possible 
for the world only when evolution is humanely directed by humans. 
 
This particular book, The Foundations of Belief, is substantially 
concerned with determining what, in the order of Christian belief, 
has been changed by the phenomenological approach and what 
has not yet been changed by it. For the truth does not really remain, 
but develop, and the original truth cannot retain its original value for 
evolving humanity unless it evolves as humanity itself evolves. 
Knowledge, (or its equivalent), is a concept of that to which 
consciousness relates itself. The specific way in which humanity 
conceives reality, and its relation to reality, will determine the limits 
within which its religious consciousness can expand. The future lies 
ahead, beyond Hellenized Hebraism, not in pre-hellenized 
Hebraism. The reshaping of the future is but the other side of the 
analysis of the past. Existentially, humanity is orientated not 
primarily toward thing-relationships, but toward existence-
relationships that are historically unique. The project of 
redeveloping Christian belief cannot rest either on the traditional 




though as they presently stand. 
 
Cultures do not frequently repudiate the religion that brought 
them into cohesive being in the first place. A more promising 
approach is to attempt to understand how the inner scission of the 
cultures of our world occurred so that we may be in a position to 
heal it. Human experience has developed to a level of self- 
consciousness, self-creativity and self-relation to reality. A Hellenist 
culture was not sufficient to express or continue this evolution.  The 
progress of Christian culture has taken place in the absence of 
conscious Christian belief. And largely by default, we tend to 
identify the way in which we in this tradition think, as the way in 
which humanity thinks. 
 
Error is not an abnormal, abortive issue of knowledge. It is the 
normal condition of its development. Error occurs in the evolution 
of humanity’s self-understanding. Because of its evolutionary 
context, Christianity must be relevant to the level of human 
consciousness achieved half to a million years after appearing on 
earth. Humanity must begin to plan for a humanity, which can begin 
to foresee the future. The novelty of the latest evolutionary 
development of humanity is that human evolution is now beginning 
to pass into a self-directed stage. Human experience changes in only 
one crucial respect, namely, in its experience of itself. Humans are 
the sort of being whose nature makes it possible for them to define 
themselves for themselves. Humans can now direct their own 
evolution. In humans “evolution is interiorized and made 
purposeful.” 5  
 
But the problem is that it is not so very easy to give a concrete shape 
to the central, final project of our total life. Nor must we suppose 
that the concrete form of this project must be the same for 
everyone. For to each life, or creative freedom, corresponds a 
vocation, (which is itself subject to evolution throughout life), which 
is not definable from the outset and which can be understood only 




undertaken not under the sign of certainty, (rational or religious), 
but only under the sign of faith, hope and love. It is a question of 
finding out what is a truly worthwhile risk. 
 
The project of our total life is not a restoration, because the 
evolution of humanity is not a return, but an assent, to God. Human 
nature is not ready-made. Human nature is on its way, evolving 
towards a goal which can be truly realized, but which was not pre-
set from the first. The goal itself is creatively determined within 
humanity’s evolutionary history in the presence of a historically 
active God. Like human culture as a whole, Christianity in the future 
may become more of a do-it- yourself affair than at any previous 
time. 
 
Belief and Necessity 
 
The most fundamental concept at work in Greco-Roman culture was 
the idea that whatever happens, happens necessarily. The creation of 
the very concept of philosophy must be interpreted as the peculiarly 
Greek reaction to the world in which civilized humanity had made 
its evolutionary appearance. Greek philosophy embodied 
humanity’s first act of faith in the intellect, and expressed its first 
act of hope that its struggle with the overwhelming reality of a 
fateful world might perhaps end in an unforeseeable victory for 
humanity. This fate and this hope were grounded upon an implicit 
realization that humanity’s consciousness or awareness is what 
defines the fundamental and constitutive relation to reality. The 
discovery of the Greek, therefore, was the astoundingly simple and 
elementary idea that humanity, by nature, relates itself to reality and 
that humanity’s relation to reality is a self-relation to reality. It is 
only after we have learned to define ourselves in terms of our 
consciousness that we can appreciate the logic of the process by 
which we became conscious of ourselves. 
 
The principal, basic, typical, natural and the most proper human 




repeatedly and extensively remarked. To be acquainted with reality 
is not to interact with it [as an object]. It is to witness it, to reflect it 
inwardly, to grasp it as it is in itself. It is not, for instance, to 
converse with it. To be acquainted with it is to see it, to watch it go 
by, to observe it as it follows its own, (necessary), way. Thus, human 
consciousness as conceptualized by the Greeks, as knowledge was 
automatically burdened with the connotation of objectivism, which 
it has retained to our own day. To assume that every being is, as 
such, constituted by an entirely self-contained necessity, is thus 
automatically to discard the possibility that it be fundamentally 
contingent upon another. 
 
The real dependence of the creature upon God does not consist in 
the former having received its necessary reality from the latter, 
but in its having received a reality, which is not necessary, even after 
it has been received. The positive gain of the last one hundred years 
of philosophy can be summed up in its having learned to take 
advantage of the reflexivity of human consciousness, arriving in the 
end at the conclusion that the mind is indeed essentially definable in 
terms of the presence of the self to itself. 
 
Belief and Knowledge 
 
To be aware of the other as such is to overcome its otherness. To be 
aware is to reach the other, to in-tend the other, despite its original 
alienation separating the other from oneself. The overcoming of this 
original alienation is what is called knowledge. To know is, 
therefore, for the mind to pass from the condition of isolation to a 
certain union with the world. Dewart underscores St Thomas’s 
explanation that this union takes place within the knower, that is, the 
cognitive power brings about the unification of the knower to the 
known, although the known is not thereby unified to the knower, 
(that is, it does not know the other, unless it is also a knower) 
[Contra Gentiles, II, 59]. In every act of knowledge, the knower 
knows an-other precisely as other-than-himself. Truth is not the 




knower to the known. The question arises, then, whether this  
assumed conformity refers to something in the knowing power or 
something in being [De Veritate, I, 2]. 
 
Insofar as one knows, the knower is the known. The union effected 
by knowledge is not a joining, but a unification. In knowledge the 
knower becomes identified with the known. In brief, as Parmenides 
put it, it is the same thing that can be and can be thought. The 
assertion refers to the nature of thinking and being, not the act of 
thinking and being. 
 
Belief and Consciousness 
 
No spatial connotation is intended by “there it is” or “here I am.” 
These are subjective states of awareness. The basic element of 
human consciousness does not imply any understanding of what “I” 
am, any more than it necessarily implies any understanding of what 
“it” is. What one does not need to learn through trial and error, what 
one does not need to be taught, and what indeed one cannot be 
taught, because it is an essential part of consciousness which 
conditions every instance of it, is that the act of consciousness itself 
is other than its object. In other words, the universe which 
knowledge reveals is to be described in terms of a dichotomy 
between the self and the world. The object-subject dichotomy is not 
the condition of the possibility of conscious experience. On the 
contrary, consciousness is the condition of the possibility of the 
opposition of subject and object. But since prior to knowledge there 
can be no such opposition, we can deduce, moreover, that 
knowledge is the introduction of an intentional opposition, an 
intentional dichotomy, into that which was originally 
undifferentiated, unrelated and perhaps even physically, continuous 
and one. Knowledge is the condition of the possibility of 
subjectivity appearing in the world of objects, by the subject’s own 
self-differentiation from, by its opposing itself to, and by opposing 
to itself, the objectivity of the world. For humanity as such is, to 




By being conscious humanity differentiates itself from the world. 
 
Humanity cannot be composed as beings, who are at bottom nothing 
but objects, even if they are objects who think. The subject is, as 
such, what an object never is, namely conscious. And 
consciousness is not reduplicative of reality, but self- presentative, 
both in the sense that it presents itself to the world, and in the sense 
that by doing so it presents itself to itself. Consciousness is, thus, 
the self-presence of being and humanity being present to itself. 
Subjectivity is being with oneself, a mode of being which is possible 
only in relation to being with another. And this is why the presence 
of the subject to itself is called consciousness. 
 
Consciousness emerges as it, differentiates, abstracts, separates and 
opposes things to each other, that is, as it objectifies the world 
of being, and as it differentiates itself from that which is not itself. 
The achievement of consciousness is the achievement of self-
possession. The achievement is the emergence or coming into being 
of a being which is present to itself. Humanity is contingent because 
it must make itself to be whatever it becomes in a situation that is, 
to begin with, given. Thus it is contingent also because this 
situation presses it, or rather, impels it to create itself. In that 
situation, however, whatever it becomes is what it makes itself. For 
knowledge is the self-differentiation of the subject, or self, from the 
world. Knowledge does place the subject in a certain relation to the 
world that was not previously held. Objects have meaning precisely 
because they are relative to the self, a self whose subjectivity results 
from its differentiation from them. There are no pre-determined 
categories in which we must think about reality, whether pre-
determined by the nature of the mind, (as Kant thought), or by the 
nature of reality, (as all pre-Kantian philosophers have thought). 
Truth and falsity pertain to the relationship between subject and 
object, not to the subject or object itself. 
 
The new gift of life cannot be given in the same way in which the 




recipient of the gift. But to be actually given, and not merely 
offered, the new existence must be accepted or received. That is, 
humans must make themselves freely and they must make 
themselves free. The offer of grace is the offer of a reality beyond 
being, and this is why it cannot be taken away by death, or 
conversely, why its absence would give death the power to take 
away human reality. The problem really is whether or not the 
analysis of religious experience reveals a reality, which transcends 
being as such. By reality, in ordinary language, we usually mean 
that which transcends consciousness, that which is other than 
oneself. Reality is whatever the self has real relations towards. 
Being, on the other hand, is the object of thought. It is that which is 
empirically given as such. The possibility that we are entertaining 
here is whether there may not be a realty which is other than being, 
a reality whose reality is not given by an act of to-be. Non-being, 
thus, does not mean, nothing. It means that which is not being. But 
should there be a real reality other than being, though it would not 
be being, it would not be, nothing. It would be something real, albeit, 
no being at all. Unlike common sense, metaphysics does not merely 
identify reality with being. Metaphysics identifies reality as being. 
 
It is historically understandable if St Thomas thought that our 
way of thinking is the human way of thinking. The fact seems to be, 
however, there is not a single way for humanity to relate itself to 
reality and that no way to do so is necessary, primary, natural or 
privileged. If the world is to be one of increasingly human control, 
the problem is that of finding an intellectual basis upon which to 
understand the meanings that the world offers us. The point is that 
ordinary human experience is insufficient unless it extends itself 
into a new extraordinary dimension. When it so extends itself, 
experience becomes religious experience or faith. Humans are, 
therefore, the beings who come into being, the beings who emerge 
as such through self-differentiation. Humans are, therefore, beings 
conscious of themselves, being present to themselves. Faith is 
precisely the transcendent, projective dimension of the presence of 




Belief and Dehellenization 
 
St Thomas Aquinas introduced into the Christian world certain 
philosophical forces that provide the principles by which the new 
Christian world could be “rebuilt.” Contrary to his thinking, one of 
the most important ways in which the Western mind has begun to 
dehellenize itself has been precisely in its “recasting” of the concept 
of becoming, honouring more faithfully and critically than at any 
previous time the observable facts, finally concluding against Plato 
and Aristotle that change is not “from opposite” to opposite and that 
it is not “the act of that which is in potency insofar as it is in 
potency” (Aristotle, Physics, III, 1 (201a 10). Becoming is not the 
result of a process of generation which begins as corruption ends. 
 
In classical philosophies cognition brings reality to humans, 
whereas a philosophical appetite brings humans to reality, thus, 
humans are the beings who exist in a situation, in a relative 
situation. The dehellenization of Christian belief does not mean 
the rejection of our Hellenic past. The term dehellenization is not 
simply negative, it is not un-hellenization, but de-hellenization. If 
we wanted to put it in strictly positive terms we might describe it as 
“the conscious creation of the future of belief.” Knowledge cannot 
be the transcending of the dichotomy between object and subject, 
because that dichotomy takes place within knowledge. Rather, the 
mind is the presence of the self to itself as it becomes present to 
things other than itself. The mind is present to itself whenever it is 
present to anything else. Truth is that property of consciousness that 
renders humanity transcendent. Truth is that quality of knowledge 
which impels consciousness beyond itself. Truth is, therefore, that 
which makes human understanding dynamic and creative, searching 
and self-critical, restless and progressive, and ambitious to the 
ultimate degree. 
 
Psychoanalysis is to date one of the most thoroughgoing and 
consistent applications of the methodological insight which came 




since it is a technique for effecting certain changes in humanity’s 
present consciousness, (in anticipation of a future condition, that is 
mental health), which are rendered possible by the present mastery 
over a remembered and analyzed past.  The history of philosophy 
is not the history, as the Greeks might have said, of one damned 
philosophical thing after another. The history of philosophy is the 
history of the progress of human thought. The task to which 
philosophy is called today is, therefore, not the dismantling and re-
construction, but the transcending of metaphysics, and not merely 
the transcending of Greek metaphysics, which is but the beginning 
of metaphysical evolution, but the transcending of every 
metaphysics, and even the transcending of its ghost, which still 
haunts phenomenological ontologies themselves. Philosophy should 
proceed to the next stage of dehellenization. Philosophy need not be 
ontological in its essential nature, if being is not the name of reality 
as such. There has been an unwarranted reduction of reality to that 























Religion, Language and Truth (1970) 
 
Evolution of humanity has deeply affected religion in general and 
belief in God in particular. Pluralism no longer means friendly 
toleration but also the inner freedom of Christian believers to put 
their varied denominational confessions to work for the common 
good. The day may come when the ecumenical movement may find 
it paradoxically necessary to promote the preservation of the 
multiplicity of Christian forms for the very sake of the spiritual unity 
of the Christian faith. We are conscious of the world that exists 
around us, obtrudes upon us and constitutes our situation and locale 
and about our own relations to that world. The gravest religious 
crisis of the Catholic Church has to do with the epistemological, 
metaphysical and other philosophical questions that underlie 
theological and religious disputes. Many people in the Church, 
particularly among those in authority, have for all practical purposes 
invested merely philosophical views with the certitude of faith and 
the authority of revelation. 
 
For the Hellenist fatefulness or necessity was not a single separate 
principle or factor or universal law affecting the world. It was an 
intrinsic characteristic of the cosmos as whole. Thus, for Hellenists 
the wise man learns to will that which will in any event come to pass. 
However, the human race is more than the totality of individuals 
existing on the surface of the earth at any given time. Humanity is 
also the historical collectively of generations succeeding generations 
in time. For, given the reality of human freedom, then humanity’s 
creation of history may well take place without, and even against, 
God. That is, humanity’s real ability to create itself, and its real 
ability – given enough time – to create a possible world, means that 
humanity, if it wants to, can create the sort of world in which there 
is no room for God, and the sort of history which dispenses with 
moral requirements transcending humanity itself. The Kingdom of 
God, or heaven, is the outcome of history when history is created by 
humanity in the presence of God. The real question is no longer 




humanity to fail to change the world and reshape history in such a 
manner that the dilemmas of the past shall not arise. 
 
It is never we who are lost. What may be lost is one’s home. 
What we may be unable to find is our chosen goal. We do not 
lose ourselves; we lose our way. But all we know is that we are here, 
without knowing where elsewhere is, we cannot find our way, that 
is, we remain unaware of the direction in which we must strike 
in order to get somewhere else. Without orientation we can only 
ramble, or else remain bound to the vicinity, pretending that the 





Language is a way of using vocal sounds that they can appear, upon 
reflection, as the vicar of, or as the label for, or as the pointer 
to, as a sign of that which is experienced by the mind. The 
message is the mind. There are no media of communication; there 
are only messages. The visual medium is the hieroglyphic, or 
ideogram, not the alphabet. Hence, such communication 
[hieroglyphics or ideogram] cannot be like writing which 
emphasizes its relational quality. Christianity holds that God created 
the world out of love. No necessity, as in Greek thinking, is part of 
God's purpose. Contingency is intrinsic to being, after it has been 
created and as it continues to exist. 
 
There is no empirically detectable difference between speaking and 
thinking. The mind is but the human body’s consciousness of itself. 
Humans are not speaking animals because they are thinking ones. 
Humans can think only because they can speak. Language is the 
condition of the possibility of thought. We fail to recognize that the 
dichotomy between thought and speech is the result of the reflexive 
properties of human consciousness.   A useful way of stating the 
view of language that is implicit on the results of our inquiry so far 




relationship to reality, language is the construction or creation of 
such a relationship. 
 
To think or talk about the world, however, is to create a relationship 
to it. Humans are not merely related to but self- related to the 
world. Thinking is one’s becoming related to the world precisely 
as a self, that is, as that which is not only related to it but knows its 
relations to it. So, when I am conscious of the table I exist, as it 
were, “in” the table, or perhaps, better, at the table. But I exist there 
as a self, my existing at the table does not confuse me with the 
table. On the contrary, I exist at the table only as other-than-it. 
 
What language and thought achieve is the creation, the viability, the 
facilitation and the continuation of the emergence of human selfhood 
in relation to the world. The activity we undertake happens to us. It 
is not anything that happens to reality in itself. What Leslie Dewart 
has had constantly in mind, both when criticizing the semantic view 
and when suggesting a syntactic alternative, has been the factuality 
of the world. Indeed, the trouble with the traditional concept of truth 
is that ultimately it would fit only a world in which the facts were 
more than the facts, a world in which the facts had an intrinsic 
meaningfulness and necessity, an inner truth which was the ground 
and cause of the reflected truth of the human mind. 
 
In other words, the need to abide by the facts does not reside in 
the facts, but in consciousness, and it does not mean that truth is 
extracted from the facts or given by their mental reduplication. 
Thus, the facts are the same for every individual, yet the truth is not 
necessarily the same for all. Meaning is not in the facts, but in the 
conscious apprehension of the facts by the person. For the 
perspective adopted here, however, it would appear more adequate 
to understand language as self-communication rather than as story-
telling. Or perhaps it might be better to say that language is creative 






Knowledge and Reality 
 
This belief in a hidden mind-like principle of reality, the Greeks 
called the inner logos (word) and, the Latins the inner ratio (reason), 
this faith in a sort of cryptic Medusan spell which reality as such 
supposedly possess within its metaphysical recesses, whence it 
exerts its final charm upon the contemplating mind, stands at the 
earliest point of transition from the primitive Greek religions to the 
sophisticated, rational religion of Greek philosophy. 
 
The essence of the superstition is the supposition that things are 
filled with something other than themselves, something that is their 
real reality. It is the supposition that nothing is really what it seems. 
If we are ignorant and un-knowing the reason is not that our skills 
are underdeveloped, but that reality is constituted by a resistant 
destiny that defies penetration by the mind. 
 
Knowledge cannot be the attainment of the inward necessities of 
things because things are not filled with necessity. To look for the 
inner constitutive principle of anything in order to understand it was 
to assume that it was intelligible precisely insofar as it was unrelated 
to everything else. Intelligibility is to be found in relations of things, 
not in the things themselves. In the case of humanity, this means that 
human nature is not to be found in the individual substance of a 
human, but in the temporal and historical projections, in the process 
by which the individual emerges out of the past towards the future. 
 
As an alternative to the traditional perspective, a functional syntactic 
interpretation of language would conceive language as the means 
whereby humanity can situate itself in the world and create its 
selfhood out of its relation to reality. Cognition is a separation which 
differentiates what is self-contained and self- sufficient out of what 
is not so. Cognition is not reduplication of another, but the creation 
of oneself. In other words, meaning is the formal condition of the 
possibility of cognitive self-relation to reality. Cognition is the self-




opposes itself to the world of objects from which it is originally 
indistinct. Language is the concrete actualization at a given moment 
of our self-creativity in relation to some determinate object out of 
the vast reality of being in the world. The truth-value of language 
hinges on its relative adequacy or effectiveness in the formation of 
consciousness. 
 
Faith and Revelation 
 
If faith is assent to a truth revealed by God, then the formulation or 
conceptualization of the truths of human faith lies outside the realm 
of human experience. Thus, truth of faith is literally a divine 
truth for it is the truth of God's own reflexive understanding 
transplanted into the human mind that can but mindlessly hold it. 
This is absurd. It is impossible for humans to know or to be aware 
of realities which humans do not experience in one way or another. 
No analysis of faith can be sound unless it is an analysis of faith 
as a form of human experience. Faith originates when humans 
suddenly discover themselves as already existing and to be a part 
of an on-going world, which is already in progress. But it does 
imply a commitment to conceive oneself and to guide oneself 
according to the view that the initiative that brings us and the world 
of being into being does not lie within ourselves.  Faith is human 
self-understanding, but precisely as relative to a transcendent 
reality beyond its own, and humanity’s self-disposition in the 
presence of a transcendent reality beyond itself. 
 
It appears that the human mind has developed and one of the 
consequences of its development has been a rising standard of 
expectation in understanding. In other words, the notion that 
revelation is a communication (to humanity) implies that human 
nature and specifically human consciousness and experience are 
essentially involved in it. The language of revelation is human even 
if the truth of it reaches beyond humanity. Revelation is, therefore, 
in a very real sense natural to humanity. Once again we reach the 




but that it must be recast in order to make allowance for humanity’s 
greater awareness of its own nature — and in particular of the 
greater awareness of the self-present character of human 
consciousness. The teaching authority will be shackled by its felt 
duty to be above all the custodian of the past, and not the architect 
of the future. Many Catholics have learned to learn as it has become 
possible to learn in modern times. The trouble is that the 
Magisterium has not learned to teach in a correspondingly advanced 
way. The teacher of today does not attempt to facilitate the 
emergence of truth and comprehension, but of truthfulness and 
creativity. Truth is a means of communication of the self. It may be 
truly said that today, in a very real sense, humanity’s capacity for 
truth has increased. Humanity must participate more consciously 
and deliberately in its own self-fashioning than it has been necessary 
or possible in the past. 
 
Truth is that quality of knowledge that accounts for the fact that the 
more we actually know, the more we potentially know. Truth is the 
enlargement of the horizon of consciousness. To insist upon any 
given conceptual, culturally concrete form of religious truth, even 
after such a form has ceased to be consistent with the current form 
of humanity’s cultural development, may be religiously prejudicial, 
precisely because it may obscure the very meaning which the 
obsolete conceptual form once revealed. 
 
The Magisterium must guide Christians to grow in their vocation, 
despite their moral and intellectual shortcomings, to the degree 
that they themselves grow in consciousness, creativity and 
responsibility. The Church is the living Body of Christ and Christ 
was not a messenger from God, but God’s self-revelation. In 
other words, the Church has no message from God; the Church is a 
message from God. 
 
Faith is that self-disposition which renders all experience 
meaningful and worthwhile. And this is the view that the Christian 




religious meaning and value to a variety of alternative forms of 
human experience while remaining an identifiably Christian faith. 
The problem is, therefore, not how to defend the traditional concept 
of God against contemporary experience, but, on the contrary, how 
to take advantage of the growth of human experience in order to 


































Evolution and Consciousness: The Role of Speech in the 
Origin and Development of Human Nature (1989) 
 
Dewart’s Dehellenization: A Mosaic of Human Experience 
 
Very few of the observations and concepts he has used in his 
investigation are original; indeed, most are not even new, Dewart 
maintains. What he has tried to accomplish here — the sort of 
task that philosophy had always deemed among its chief 
responsibilities, though in the anglophone world as he gathers no 
longer — is mainly to arrange a large number of tesserae that, if 
taken one by one, are very familiar, into the single mosaic of a fairly 
comprehensive and unconventional synthesis. 
 
If we understood sufficiently well how human nature came into 
being, we would have mastered why the conditions of human life 
today are such as they are — which would, of course, facilitate 
our improving them. Philosophic explanations of human evolution 
have usually depended on the postulation of some sort of 
evolutionary force that fuelled the development of life from within, 
as it were, or else attracted it from ahead or directed it from above. 
 
For a thousand years before Scholasticism the world had 
accordingly appeared to Christians as a system of natural forces — 
a hierarchy of “causes” and “effects” — which had itself been 
caused by the all-necessitating power of a transcendent First Cause. 
But a further interpretation of God’s creative causality, developed in 
the thirteenth century principally by Thomas Aquinas, introduced a 
novelty that stated with precision what had been, at best, confusedly 
implicit in earlier Christian thought: God’s creativity consisted not 
only in the causation of what creatures were — or of their “essences” 
— but above all of their being whatever they were — or of their 
“existing,” as we would more commonly say today. 
 
Having originated with philosophy, a phenomenological disposition 




in its nature restricts its usefulness to this field. Phenomenology is 
at bottom no more — and no less — than a radical empiricism. 
The reduction of the humanity of human beings — to anything — 
results from a sort of self-doubt or self- suspicion that is no more 
justified when it operates under scientific than under theological 
sanction; behaviourism is a modern form of an ancient prejudice that 
some human beings seem to have against themselves. 
 
The essence of human life lies in its having a conscious quality. 
Being conscious is what we immediately experience ourselves to be. 
Conscious experience is the sort that enables the experiencer to 
become aware of the otherness of the world. It is only because our 
experience is conscious that we have selfhood, or that we enjoy 
conscious identity. To be a self is to be capable of experiencing our 
reality as a conscious experiencer and as the conscious agent of our 
behaviour. The ability to experience reality as such and ourselves as 
real is the essence of human, conscious life. 
 
It is a defining characteristic of all life that it tends to preserve itself 
by adjusting to its environment. It is typical of animal life that its 
adjustment is mediated by sensory abilities that furnish the 
organism with experience of itself and its world. Unlike an animal, 
a human being adjusts by relating itself, to a world that is perceived 
as real to itself, whom it perceives as a self, and to other selves, 
whom it perceives as beings who perceive themselves as selves and 
other human beings as selves. A phenomenological procedure 
allows us to have direct access to ourselves, our self-understanding 
need not be mediated by our prior understanding of anything else. 
It has been suggested that the ability to experience consciously is 
not inborn, but acquired. Consciousness is a skill, an 
accomplishment that perfects the inborn experiential functions of 
the human organism. It cannot be, of course, a consciously 
developed skill. No one is in a position, before he is conscious, to 
make a conscious decision whether to acquire consciousness. 
 




being present to itself, every conscious experience reveals to itself 
the opposition between its content and the act. Since the 
phenomenal consciousness does not project its assertiveness onto 
reality, it does not condemn itself to having to conceive reality as 
“being” or as “what exists.” Phenomenal consciousness 
automatically escapes the snares of metaphysical thought by failing 
to set them for itself. And since it does not assume that objects have 
any priority over conscious experience it will not suppose that there 
are degrees of reality. Phenomenological philosophy takes for 
granted that there cannot be “another world.” The empirically given 
world is the only real one. The reality of a thing is its relativity to 





































A First Person Scientific Reflection 
 
I put emphasis on the sub-title, “A First Person Philosophical 
Reflection,” in order to avoid any misunderstanding as to the 
intent of this book as an application of philosophical 
dehellenization. This book is a serious personal reflection in the first 
person. It is not a systematic presentation or exposé of a body of 
thought or a collection of philosophical ideas. Rather, it is an 
account of my personal thinking as I have come to understand it, by 
reading the works and digesting the ideas of other religious 
philosophers on the same topic, in particular, Dr Leslie Dewart. This 
chapter is a selection of certain personal reflections arising out of 
my understanding of philosophical religious insight as suggested by 
Edmund Husserl. This is to be found in his Philosophy as Rigorous 
Science and Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man, complied 
by Quentin Laurer. 6 Initially, my personal reflections seemed as 
new revelations to me but over time, I had discovered that many 
other religious philosophers had discovered them as well. Among 
these religious philosophers, but not very well known today, are 
William Gladstone (1809-1898) and George Tyrrell (1861-1909). 
William Gladstone, an adherent of Church of England, was the 
English Prime Minister during the reign of Queen Victoria. George 
Tyrrell, S. J., a convert to Roman Catholicism, was a central 
figure in the so-called Modernist movement within Catholic belief 
as it developed in England. Although these two individuals never 
met they shared a common philosophical quest for authentic 




elsewhere of the significance of their critical reflective and 
religious philosophical insights for our contemporary world. 7 It is, 
however, the philosophical mind of Leslie Dewart that alerted me 
to the theme of dehellenization developing within Western 
Christian philosophical and religious thinking. During my 
undergraduate years at St Michael’s College, University of Toronto, 
he introduced me to a method of critical and reasoned thinking that 
I have continued to employ up to the present day. In effect, he has 
tilled the philosophical ground for my personal reflections via a 
process of dehellenization. It is this process of dehellenization upon 
which I reflect personally and present in this chapter. 
 
To my mind, contemporary religious philosophers, whether they are 
Jewish, Christian or Muslim, have a personal responsibility towards 
their respective communities of faith. This responsibility applies to 
their effort to produce a reasoned and scientific philosophy that is 
capable of supporting the faith of their traditions. William James 
appears to be of the same mind. 8 It is more responsible for the 
religious philosopher to promote a reasoned and scientific 
philosophy, than a cultural folklore. A reasoned philosophy is not 
new given that its roots extend back to the ancient Greek thinkers. 
However, a reasoned and scientific philosophy is new in that it has 
produced the natural sciences that characterize Modernity. In short, 
my mind follows that of Alister McGrath who has probed the 
manner in which the natural sciences have “become the ancilla 
theologiae nova.” 9  A reasoned and scientific philosophy, as an 
ancilla theologiae nova, is not confined to a particular revealed faith 
tradition but is susceptible of interfaith dialogue. I do not suggest, 
however, that this personal responsibility need apply to religious 
philosophers of other, and non-revealed, belief systems or traditions. 
My reflection is reserved to the three previously mentioned 
traditions. 
 
Religious philosophical thinking, carried out in the Jewish, Christian 
and Muslim traditions, must occur within, not without, their 




experiences of believers by passing on to future generations the 
fruits of their reflection. To my mind, in order for a religious 
philosopher to be credible today, scientific reflective thinking is a 
requirement. In the Western context, folklore, by itself, is not 
sufficient. Further, for our study of the past to be helpful it must  
suggest a strategy for coping with present experience. “In any 
field of experience, the results of new theories and new data will 
present a challenge to the conventional wisdom, but especially is 
this so when the new knowledge probes some of the most vulnerable 
and sensitive areas of our beliefs.” 10  The activity of scientific 
religious philosophical thinking does probe some of the most 
sensitive and essential areas of our belief. It does this as a 
phenomenological, dehellenized philosophy à la Edmund Husserl, 
about which I will say more below. In any interfaith religious 
philosophical reflection, scientific reflective collaboration among all 
participants is a requirement. Scientific reflective collaboration is a 
rational, clear, consistent and methodological sharing of insights, 
professionally undertaken, into the personal, but not the private, 
experience of God. This constitutes theological activity. In short, 
scientific reflective collaboration is not folklore. 
 
Among all the disciplines available to assist me, as a theologian in 
the critical task of collaborative reflection, a scientific philosophy is 
a most fundamental one. Psychology, sociology, history, 
anthropology, etc., make a contribution to the task but it is only 
philosophy that is in a privileged position to undertake this task 
of theological collaborative reflection. I have accepted Edmund 
Husserl’s view on the ability of philosophy to disclose essential 
insights that other disciplines cannot. In his perspective only 
philosophy can transcend being and address essence, whereas, the 
other disciplines, without transcending being, address being and the 
“that which” without which a thing cannot be. The universal 
character of a scientific philosophy suggests that it is to be 
preferred to any sociology or psychology in assisting the theologian 
in the task of critically interpreting the experience of the believing 




personal and transcendental reflective way of evaluating the essence 
of experience. In contrast, disciplines like psychology and sociology 
are primarily corporate and non-transcendental factual ways of 
describing experience. The recent disciplines of psychology and 
sociology, conceived as “soft” sciences, share the clinical roots of a  
scientific attitude characteristic of the Cartesian mind-set. Such is 
not the case with a modern scientific philosophy that relates to the 
ancient discipline of Hellenic philosophy. Contrary to much current 
opinion, I suggest that Cartesian science is less suitable as an 
interpretive methodology for the theologian than a dehellenized 
science that has re-evaluated its Hellenic heritage, or more 
accurately, its Hellenistic heritage. James Payton makes the 
distinction between the Hellenic philosophy that developed within 
the culture of ancient Greece, and the Hellenistic philosophy that 
developed later within other cultures, that is, the European cultures, 
which incorporated their influence to some degree. 11  In short, 
contemporary Western philosophy needs to re-think the Cartesian 
mind-set and undertake a critical reflective interpretation of 
experience. In a critical philosophical reflection, I do know all the 
right questions to ask much less know all the right answers. Arising 
out of my experience, existential philosophical questions, which 
arise out of my intellect, preoccupy me today. An essential and 
phenomenological philosophical way of thinking, which is an 
existential way of thinking, is a contemporary method by which 
scientific philosophers may most satisfactorily evaluate their 
experience in community. There is no denying that in contemporary 
Western philosophical thinking such an essential method of 
philosophizing is replacing the classical method of philosophizing 
through a process of dehellenized interpretation.  
 
A scientific philosophical approach is proper to Jewish, Christian 
and Islamic philosophy. By a scientific philosophical approach, I 
mean an interpretation of experience that has been arrived at 
through a critical methodology in contrast to an understanding of 
experience described in the folklore of one’s particular culture. A 




of faith communities. That means that a scientific religious 
philosophy is not the preserve of a single organized, visible and 
corporate community of faith, as previously mentioned, but is 
common to all three of them. Yet, within a Christian scientific 
philosophy there is the possibility that not all members of the visible  
Christian community belong to the invisible Christian community 
and vice versa. Baron Friedrich von Hügel, a contemporary of 
William Gladstone and George Tyrrell, had observed this same 
phenomenon. 12  A scientific philosophy, given its capacity to 
transcend differing cultures, is less likely to become enslaved to 
an institutional and political ideology than a philosophy dependent 
upon a particular cultural perspective. Such transcendence takes on 
significance for the interpretation of belief when the primary focus 
is on the word of God scientifically addressed within the believing 
community. In Jewish and Islamic religious philosophy, however, 
given the apparent lack of an equivalent to the Christian 
Reformation, it is questionable as to what degree this capacity to 
transcend differing cultural factions occurs in these two traditions. 
This question cannot be further pursued here, but merely brought 
to the fore. Whatever the religious context, should scientific 
philosophy fail at transcending ideological and institutional 
interests it then becomes a mere servant of the visible and temporal 
corporate community, and would not serve the true spiritual 
interests of the faithful. Such failure would amount to a living death 
for both the individual and the community. 
 
Scientific philosophy must be distinguished from a pre-reflective 
attitude, which is a separate experiential activity in its own right. 
Poetry, myth and epic narratives reflect this attitude. As a distinct 
intellectual and experiential activity, however, scientific philosophy 
has its roots in the practical Western thinking of the early 19 t h  
Century. Within the contemporary European context scientific 
philosophy, that is, phenomenological philosophy reaches beyond 
the individualism of Western religious traditions. Scientific 
philosophy arising out of the context of the intellectual 




from a theoretical and ideological perspective to an essential and 
phenomenological perspective. In short, scientific philosophy is 
developing essentially into a dehellenized philosophy. However, 
despite this change scientific philosophy is still under-appreciated 
as a tool for those preparing to minister professionally in the  
interests of a particular religious tradition or faith community. One 
purpose of a scientific philosophy is to apprehend the meaning of a 
ministerium verbi divini, that is, to understand the Word the God of 
which is somehow beyond the concrete existential faith community. 
In the concrete existential faith community any spatial dichotomy 
between essence and praxis cannot be maintained in light of a 
scientific philosophy. In short, our understanding of the ministerium 
verbi divini must become dehellenized. 
 
Scientific philosophy is nothing less than a scientific 
understanding of personal religious experience within a collective 
context, that is, within a community. As personal religious 
experience, scientific philosophy cannot be merely theoretical, 
that is, a non-existential or non-incarnated, discipline. As a merely 
theoretical and non-incarnated discipline scientific philosophy 
would lack the ability to examine the experience of doctrine or 
dogma in a believer’s faith tradition. A theoretical and 
systematic objective examination of corporate and confessional 
faith standards of doctrine and dogma belongs more properly to 
the domain of religious studies and is not to be confused with a 
philosophical scientific theology. In a scientific philosophical 
reflection the disciplines that are the loci for such reflection are not 
restricted to the classical and theoretical disciplines of traditional 
academia. Rather, all human experience provides the loci for an 
essential scientific philosophical reflection. 
 
Further, there are certain existentialia, or existential experiences, 
that make possible the basic dispositions I adopt within life. They 
are fear, despair, love, hope, suffering, death, happiness, and guilt. 
But these existentialia make up only one part of my existential 




God’s part, which is the theoretical part (a parte Dei). The religious 
philosophical interpretation of Judaism, Christianity and Islam 
recognizes that God’s personal initiative calls all persons into 
existence from non-existence. Such initiative awaits an existential 
response from the person. For the phenomenologically minded  
philosopher questions require responses from each part, that is, from 
God’s part and ours. However, it is only our part, not God’s, which 
is the focus of scientific philosophical enquiry. Scientific 
philosophy says nothing about God’s essence or existence. Quentin 
Lauer notes that even though Edmund Husserl did not enter into 
humanity’s ultimate concerns he did confine himself to 
“philosophy’s ultimate concerns, and these, he feels, are what 
philosophy can know with absolute, apodictic certitude. If God, 
freedom, and immortality cannot be known this way, then they 
simply are no concern of philosophy.” Therefore, scientific 
philosophy’s ultimate concern with respect to religious experience 
must be in dialogue with a community of artists, musicians, 
novelists, poets, philosophers, theologians, and always with the 
scriptures of a faith community. The revealed scriptures, not the 
doctrinal confessional standards of a faith community, are the data 
necessary for a scientific philosophical reflection. Artistry, music, 
novels, poetry, and theology are not necessary, but elective, within 
a scientific philosophical reflection. 13  
 
The act of philosophizing upon one’s experience is universal in 
the sense that it constitutes all human reflection, whereas other 
disciplined activities merely augment human reflection. 
Contemporary human reflection need not be artistic, musical, 
literary, poetical or theological, but it must be scientific, that is, 
methodological and not folkloric, if it is to address the ultimate 
concerns of philosophy in Edmund Husserl’s sense of the term. 
By this I do not deny that confessional corporate doctrine and 
dogma provide important data for religious philosophizing. I do 
mean, however, that religious philosophizing on confessional 
corporate doctrine and dogma is another activity and not of 




religious sociology or religious psychology or another “soft” 
science. The most important data for religious sociology or religious 
psychology is provided by non-reflective experience of a faith 
community as a corporation, that is, as historical data. The most 
important data for scientific religious philosophizing, however, is  
provided by reflection on personal experience within the 
community. Thus, the old metaphysical and religious philosophical 
quests for a God that can be proved to exist are futile in the world 
of scientific philosophy. Further, such quests that are not rooted in 
reflective experience are theoretical and tell us nothing about the 
divine status. The task of the scientific religious philosopher is not 
look for a polemic opportunity to prove a doctrinal point. Rather, 
the task is to express and to clarify the reflective experience of 
faith vis á vis scripture and tradition. Such is the primary task of the 
Hebrew, Christian and Islamic scientific religious philosopher — or 
theologian. 
 
In the West, one’s religious life may be legally private but it is 
ethically and morally public. A scientific religious philosopher must 
be ethically and morally accountable within the public forum. The 
scientific religious philosophical developments that bring about 
social transformation within the public forum arise from a 
reciprocal relationship between the individual and the community. 
My moral duty, that is to say, my ethical religious response is not 
restricted, nor limited, to certain portions of the social, political or 
faith life. Rather, my ethical religious response is nothing less than 
my total public life that is shaped within and by the larger 
community. The morality of my total public life can only be 
revealed by a scientific religious philosophy, which validates the 
disciplines enlisted to aid in its disclosure. 
 
After Vatican II the Roman Catholic Church deliberately attempted 
to enter a conversation about religious meaning in the public forum 
with other faith communities. Vatican II recognized that the 
corporate Church is to serve all humanity in its religious, as well as, 




defining her religious philosophy in the public forum. It needed to 
move from a religious philosophy that had, to a great extent, become 
Romanesque folklore to a scientific philosophy. Today, all 
Christians must converse, both intellectually and spiritually, with 
many other communities of differing and sometimes opposing 
religious philosophies. Specifically, beginning from the early 19th 
century onwards, the Roman Catholic Church left its classical 
corporate self-understanding to a significant degree and took on a 
personal self-understanding. And summarized by John Kobler: “As 
a result of this philosophical probing of the really real, leading 
intellectuals in Europe underwent an enormous attitude shift from 
Concepts (abstract scientific reason) to Life (concrete conscious 
experience)” [Kobler’s italics]. 14 Within Western Christendom this 
change in perspective initiated the so-called Modernist Movement, 
being a “phase of the liberalising movement in the Church of 
Rome by the Civiltà Cattolica, and it may be accepted: Modernism 
may be described as the shape which religion takes in the mind of 
the modern as distinct from the mediaeval man.” 15 Modernism 
yields its greatest insights when considered as a scientific 
philosophy, which expressed itself within Roman Catholicism. In 
understanding herself personally the Roman Church had to abandon 
the theoretical notion that a single cultural norm, originating in 
ancient Rome, could continue to determine her self-understanding 
in the tradition of Hellenistic philosophical thinking. Thus, it was 
that the Roman Church accepted the essential and 
phenomenological approach that through a variety of cultures an 
active self-understanding can be developed through a process of a 
scientific religious philosophy, or through a process of 
dehellenization. 
 
In the contemporary Western context, the majority of faith 
communities seek to dialogue with partners holding common beliefs 
wherever they may be found. These faith communities often 
practice religious tolerance, characteristic of the neutrality of the 
state, as a civic virtue. However, in addition to this positive effect, 




variation resulting from civic tolerance in public religious dialogue 
fragments true discourse. Today, in the West, it seems that a 
concerted public religious philosophical discourse is lacking due to 
an exaggeration of civic tolerance leading to an “anything goes” 
attitude. Further, too much variation makes corporate dialogue  
extremely difficult. Often, lack of dialogue is evident beyond 
national boundaries. From a global perspective, Christian religious 
traditions lack a common public philosophical language for 
discourse among themselves, and with non- Christian traditions, to 
discuss public meaning, value, and experience. As a result, today 
much Christian religious philosophy is not as influential in the 
public forum as it had been in the past. The current situation in 
American Orthodoxy is a case in point. 16  In short, classical 
Christendom is dead, or better, Hellenism is dead. Therefore, even 
though as Christians we inherit a religious context that has been 
well established and can easily be distinguished from a secular 
context our religious philosophy lacks a common public language 
which makes any discussion with other religious philosophies 
difficult. 
 
Earlier, systematic theologians had invoked science in an attempt to 
address this problem of ecumenical and inter-faith dialogue. “St 
Thomas, for example, showed great skill in combining science and 
for the purpose of defining the Catholic position in the world. 17 
We know today, however, that traditional science, often the 
standard of contemporary secular discussion, does not give 
answers to the deeper questions of meaning as it once did. In 
short, the optimism generated by 18th Century scientific progress 
has not materialized. Today, the more significant answers are 
provided by scientific philosophers who answer existential and 
essential questions and not by the merely theoretical and secular 
scientists. The Western religious philosophical tradition has 
developed a notion of a personal and collective humanum whose 
essence is capable of being consciously apprehended. That is, 
what describes humanity is captured in the humanum within the 




and government to enhance this humanum within the world. Only 
in the recent past has this enhancement been challenged by an 
inordinate development of an individualism which has permitted 
the concept of individual sovereignty to take preference, as it 
were, over the notion of a personal humanum. Such inordinate  
intellectual individualism may be corrected though an 
understanding of the humanum of a scientific religious philosophy. 
 
In a scientific religious philosophy, one that supports a 
phenomenological theology, the idea of individual sovereignty 
cannot be an absolute ideal. The individual must be subordinated to 
God in some manner. Gaudium et Spes, or The Pastoral Constitution 
on the Church of the Second Vatican Council supported the concept 
that there is inherent value and meaning in the lives of all individuals 
who make up the social community. This inherent value and 
meaning is disclosed within the essence of the world’s humanum 
and manifested ultimately as a Christian humanitarianism. Further, 
Gaudium et Spes notes that Christian humanitarianism is founded on 
a human dignity that is ultimately grounded upon God’s revelation 
in Christ to individuals living in Christian communion. The imitatio 
Christi, as a particular way of life, then, is an embodiment of the 
essence of the personal humanum. Thus, in the contemporary era, 
religious philosophers and theologians have two tasks. The first is 
to interpret the corporate tradition of experience and the second is to 
interpret an individual’s experience within that tradition. Both 
interpretations may be supported by a scientific religious 
philosophy. 
 
As noted earlier, a phenomenological understanding is an alternative 
approach to theoretical understanding in religious philosophy. A 
phenomenological understanding does not emphasise the 
acquisition of skills, nor does it emphasise the development of a 
more comprehensive understanding of faith. The intent of a 
phenomenological approach is dehellenization, or the conscious 
creation of the future of belief. This is a radically different approach 




out of the European university system. Originally, religious colleges 
were set up to serve the academic and philosophical interests of the 
European Churches in their debates over the various theological 
opinions surrounding doctrine and dogma. This contrasted with 
issues of personal development. However, in our time, much  
Christian scientific religious philosophy is directed towards an 
essential understanding of personal issues instead of the debating of 
dogma and doctrine. In Christian scientific philosophical education 
the intent is to recognize the essential unity of one’s mind to Christ’s 
in such a way that praying and believing is one. A Christian 
scientific philosophy divorced from prayer is in trouble. A scientific 
religious philosophy that arises from the experience of the Christian 
God constitutes the essence of the creation of the future of belief. 
From this perspective, then, the particular disciplines of Pastoral 
Psychology and Pastoral Counselling, arising within an academic 
study of religion, address the believer’s emotional constitution. 
Pastoral Psychology and Pastoral Counselling are verified, as it 
were, by a scientific religious philosophy. However, these particular 
sciences are not theology proper and, as a result, do not address 
the believer’s spiritual constitution. 
 
These particular disciplines, however, assist in developing the 
unfinished scientific philosophical business of the late 19 t h  and 
early 20 t h  centuries. That unfinished business continues to arise 
within the tension between a personal and a corporate philosophical 
understanding. Again, I cite the so-called Modernist Crisis, or 
Modernist Movement, which challenged the dominant corporate 
religious philosophical mind-set of the West with its roots in the 
scholastic tradition. As a result, this movement was condemned, as 
far as the Roman Catholic Church was concerned and, thus had no 
future among Catholic religious philosophers. However, history 
indicates otherwise and, to the benefit of the Church, positive 
insights have been gained from the scientific scholarship of 
Modernism, which have been introduced by Catholic philosophers 
into Western theology. One such theological benefit is the emphasis 




corporate understanding, of the experience of the faith. I suggest that 
many of the positive results of the scientific scholarship of 
Modernism that have been accepted by Catholic philosophers are 
the realisations of the hope of the English religious philosopher, 
George Tyrrell. One such result, hoped for by Tyrrell, was that  
subjectivity and inter-subjectivity in philosophical methodology 
would replace ideological theory and ratiocination as primary in 
philosophical thought. However, much contemporary Catholic 
religious philosophical thinking, immediately prior to and since 
the election of Pope Benedict XVI, seems to be developing away 
from such scientific religious philosophical thinking. A particular 
philosophical understanding, of an earlier age, that is, Roman 
scholasticism, seems to be supplanting Vatican II’s 
phenomenological approach, thus favouring a return to a Hellenized 
and traditional understanding over a phenomenological 
understanding. 
 
Above, I distinguished between religious philosophy and religious 
studies. Religious philosophy characterizes the ministerium verbi 
divini, that is, a service to the word of God. The ministerium verbi 
divini is a broad concept and found not only in Christian 
understanding. Although it carries a particular meaning when 
understood within the Christian context. The ministerium verbi 
divini, as disclosed through an understanding of scientific religious 
philosophy, is appropriate for interpreting the subject of Jewish and 
Muslim theologies as well as the subject of Christian theology. 
While the ministerium verbi divini is a service to the individual in 
community, God is the one who is primarily served through the 
ministerium verbi divini. Such service, rendered to God, occurs 
within Jewish, Christian and Muslim revelation. At this point the 
question arises: Can such service be rendered to God outside of these 
faith traditions? Or, put another way, can a scientific philosophical 
understanding be beneficial to those who live outside a believing 
community? Further, in the Christian context, a particular question 
arises: Is being within the visible corporate church a prerequisite for 




Second Vatican Council, noted that Catholic Christians 
acknowledged the invisible Church within the visible Church yet not 
simply as identical or co-extensive with it. In other words, there are 
many individuals within the visible Church who do not belong to 
the invisible Church and vice versa. Through service to the Word of  
God, then, scientific religious philosophers, Christian and non-
Christian, need to somehow embody their thinking existentially and 
essentially in a first person reflective philosophical inquiry. 
 
As a scientific religious philosopher, I find myself reflecting in an 
existential situation that I have not made or designed, but rather have 
inherited. Furthermore, I cannot stop my continual existential 
development and I am personally involved in its transformation. 
Thus, as a Western Christian, I live with the anxiety and tensions 
that accompany the end of conventional corporate Christianity. 
However, within this tension that signals the end of conventional 
corporate Christianity, there are indications of a new constitution 
and a new future for corporate Christianity. As one religious 
philosopher has noted: “I intend to clarify somewhat…what 
prospects are opening up for the possibility of a new form and 
practice of belief in God which modern man, standing in the nascent 
world of our time, can consider responsible.” 18  These new 
prospects are disclosed within the process of dehellenization, or 
within the creation of the future of belief. 
 
A scientific understanding of the person in community demonstrates 
a shift in the methodology of Western religious philosophical 
thinking. Such a shift did begin in the West soon after the First 
World War. About this time there was also a shift in the 
understanding of that which is transcendent and that which is sacred. 
No longer was the transcendent and the sacred understood to be 
disclosed through a feudal and monarchical society, which had given 
its form to the medieval institutional church. The medieval 
institutional church remained constant as the Western European 
feudal culture evolved into an industrial civilization and democratic 




visible feudal church may have enjoyed the benefits of its presence 
and social activity but they were not direct participants in its 
spiritual activity or life. Yet, this did not mean that those outside the 
visible limits of the feudal Church were not members of an invisible 
Church in some manner. Indeed, many of us know through direct  
experience that is it the case that from those who have been 
excommunicated from the visible Church, the true Church is often 
constituted. 
 
In contemplating revelation scientific religious philosophers do 
not confine themselves to any pre-given philosophical system. 
Our scientific philosophical reflections arise out of an intellectual 
world of the inner human experience that is disclosed within various 
cultures. In a similar manner the pre-scientific cultures, such as the 
folkloric cultures, but not of the Jewish, Christian or Islamic 
tradition, have mythologies that explain and interpret their inner 
human experience. 19 Christian scientific philosophy differs from 
Christian ideological philosophy in that it takes human experience 
as its primary subject matter, not doctrine and dogma. This means 
that, as subject matter for a scientific religious philosophical 
interpretation, historical texts and records themselves are secondary. 
In short, scientific religious philosophical reflection is an activity of 
reflection on personal experience, not on the intellectualization of 
ideals or values. 
 
In a scientific religious philosophy, I, as a believer, transcend the 
boundaries of my creaturely existence in such a way that I become 
more truly and holistically myself. Such a transcendental encounter 
is not for mystics only. Rather, it is the centre of life for all 
Christians. I come to know myself as I come to know any other 
person, that is, through reflection. For faithful Christians this 








Scientific Philosophy and the Experience of the Individual in 
Community 
 
In the balance of this chapter I place emphasis on the secondary 
purpose of the ministerium verbi divini. Primarily, God is to be 
served through service to the Word. However, I reflect here upon 
the individual’s experience in community that creates a future for 
personal and collective belief. For many believers, our experience is 
that we are estranged from the religion we have inherited. This 
estrangement is due to the end of conventional Christianity and the 
death of the concept of the traditional God. The traditional 
philosophical conventions developed and designed to protect us 
from anxiety in our human condition have been shown to be 
inadequate and unsuccessful in the modern world. New 
philosophical safeguards that are characteristic of phenomenology, 
not scholasticism, are in the process of being created. However, their 
general acceptance is relative and somewhat limited within 
contemporary philosophical thought. The traditional safeguards of a 
religious philosophical ideology have been largely expressed in 
classical terms within conventional Christianity. These classical 
forms of expression, conceptions, and customs, as well as 
Christianity’s spirit and mentality are rooted in the world of a 
Greco-Roman-Germanic civilization that has its anchor in ancient 
Hellenic philosophy. Experience has shown that profound changes 
due to our existential philosophical understanding bring about 
changes in conventional Christianity. As an example, the change 
from an objective to a subjective point of view in interpreting our 
experience accounts for the fact that many Christian churches 
have become humanized institutions in which we, not God, are 
the measure. 
 
Scientific philosophy supplies an intellectual embodiment and 
methodology for theologically interpreting revelation within a 
community. The embodiment and methodology of scientific 
religious philosophy, as a human phenomenon, is essentially the 




revelation needs to be in harmony with the mind of the age. The 
interpretation of revelation amounts to an ever-varying expression 
of spiritual experience. As a religion, Christianity is a doctrinal 
system and a construct of human understanding. Christianity, 
because of its later, that is, post-Socratic Hellenic conditioning, is a 
construction, not of poetical, but of theological, philosophical, 
ethical, scientific and historical beliefs and conceptions of the 
teaching of Christ. An examination of religion as a social 
construction thus leads to self-discovery and to the act of seeing for 
ourselves and to the act of doing for ourselves. 
 
The philosophy most suitable for contemporary scientific 
philosophers to disclose what is “known” is phenomenology. 
Phenomenology permits the scientific philosopher to attain an 
essential understanding of experience as pure consciousness. Only 
in an essential understanding of experience as pure consciousness 
can the Christian experience be profoundly meaningful. Because 
phenomenology allows apprehension of essences as pure 
consciousness in Husserl’s sense, it is able to disclose the profound 
meaning of God’s influence upon the human-as-subject. As well, 
individual scientific philosophical thinking has an influence on the 
moral and social life of the community. History shows us that the 
majority of religious philosophical development has not been the 
work of professional doctrinal and dogmatic philosophers, for these 
are catechists, but rather of individuals who have to some extent 
corrected and modified the system. Such modification has often 
happened in opposition to official philosophical doctrine and 
dogma. The thinking of these individuals and their philosophical 
views have acted and reacted on each other. The philosophical 
engagement, by individuals who corrected and modified the system, 
was conducted in such a manner that their philosophy more properly 
reflected the signs of their times, rather than classical times. 
 
Scientific religious philosophy seems, for the moment at least, to lie 
outside the official Catholic tradition of the interpretation of 




regarded by the official Catholic magisterium, that is, the teaching 
authority of the Church, as incapable of properly interpreting 
revelation. However, Pope Benedict XVI’s comment calling for us 
to broaden our concept of reason suggests that all interpretation, 
including scientific interpretation, might be included in official 
Catholic interpretation. 20 The philosopher’s job is to inquire into 
experience, not to interpret revelation. Theological interpretation is 
for the theologian. The scientific religious philosopher’s 
investigations are made within the existential order and not from 
probing the depths of revelation that discloses the mind of God, as 
it were. It could be argued that the special task of Christian 
metaphysics, which does not belong to scientific philosophy from 
Edmund Husserl’s perspective, is to show that which grounds the 
total picture of the world reflected by the Christian faith. Thus, 
scientific philosophers are not central to church’s life but the sensus 
fidelium is. In other words, the Church could get along without a 
scientific philosophical class of professional thinkers but it could 
not get along without the sensus fidelium. 
 
History shows that controversial issues in religion, characterized by 
the Modernist movement, which was introduced by the new 
scientific knowledge of the late 19th and early 20th centuries into 
the American Church, were contested at the pastoral or practical 
level. However, the same controversial issues in France and England 
were contested at the level of philosophical and theoretical 
argument. The French and English philosophers could not 
understand the non-metaphysical or practical language of the North 
American philosophers and theologians. Thus, they tended to look 
upon American thought as somewhat heretical. This view created a 
dichotomy between North American and Continental philosophical 
thought. As  was the case in England and the Continent that liberal 
Catholics attempted to integrate the new scientific knowledge 
within the teaching authority of the Church. That is to say that the 
Modernists, for their part, attempted to reconcile the conflict 
between the Church and new scientific knowledge by up-dating the 




Unlike philosophy, theology is a process involving the self- 
revelation of that which is Divine. For the French and Italian 
Modernists theological study was a natural activity that included a 
life of prayer. Many Modernist theologians accepted that a saintly 
life replaced the scholastic philosophical understanding of doctrine 
and dogma as the proper interpreter of revelation. As George Tyrrell 
reminds us, “Theology is not the product of the spiritual life of the 
faithful, but of the intellectual life of the Schools.” 21 In the time of 
George Tyrrell there was a trend away from professional 
theologians serving the doctrinal and dogmatic needs of the Church. 
The new trend was to engage in a scientific religious philosophy 
and to develop a methodology to serve the existential needs of the 
individual in community. Even so, the trend was minimally 
successful and classical philosophical construction, which is rooted 
in scholasticism, has remained to a large degree an activity of the 
institutional Church and not an activity of the sensus fidelium. 
 
Today, scientific religious philosophy, as a human discipline, must 
take into account all religious phenomena, not just Christianity. 
Scientific religious philosophy is a labour of reason that recognizes 
revelation from the Jewish, Christian and Islamic perspectives. It 
must be remembered that any scientific philosophy is an 
afterthought, that is, a reflective exercise of our understanding. 
Thus, from a scientific religious philosophical perspective it matters 
little that Christianity has developed in Orthodox, Roman, 
Reformed and Protestant forms. Within a scientific religious 
philosophical approach all Christians are able to share in the 
transition to a new expression and practice of the faith through a 
phenomenological approach in interpreting their experience. 
 
Further, in light of my experience, I suggest that a 
phenomenological philosophy, as a scientific philosophy, brings 
about an end to the antithesis that exists among Orthodoxy, Rome 
and the Reformation. I suggest that phenomenological philosophy 
does this by bringing an end to the antithesis between objectivism 




words, phenomenologically understood, any distinction between 
them is a logical fiction, not factual. Thus, in ending this antithesis, 
a new Christian realization may be neither Orthodox, nor Roman, 
nor Reformed. This presents an exciting possibility for scientific 
religious philosophers. It was an exciting possibility for Maude 
Petre, who, as a result of being a close friend and confidant of 
George Tyrrell, was influenced by Modernist thought. But, there 
have been some spurious and erroneous notions within 
contemporary philosophical thinking that have arisen out of the 
Modernist movement, which have altered our orthodox 
understanding. Erroneous notions arise when Christianity is 
understood without Christ and becomes, not a new Christianity, but 
a new social ideal. And Christianity understood with a mystical, but 
not historical, Christ is not a new Christianity but rather another 
religion. Further, Christianity understood with Christ as a moral 
ideal but not worthy of worship, is not new Christianity, but an 
adaptation of Christian teaching to other religious or moral systems. 
It is clear that in Christian religious philosophy certain 
developments are not proper developments at all. Rather, they are 
substitutions of one idea for another. In such cases of substitution 
authentic Christianity has a better chance of survival in its old from 
rather than in any new form. 
 
The survival of orthodox Christianity requires that philosophy 
and theology take a scientific approach in the contemporary age 
otherwise they have no reason to exist. This is especially true in the 
University where they fulfill their task of inquiry into the rationality 
of faith. 22  In our contemporary context with its emphasis on the 
needs of the individual there is a danger that the believing 
community may be understood as less than necessary for the 
spiritual life. This is an erroneous belief. One  must not forget that 
it is through the believing community that new generations are 
introduced to the faith. It must not be forgotten that the task of the 
philosopher is the analysis of public life and of communal 
experience with regard to essential individual issues. Further, it must 




the philosopher’s task are secondary, even though they may have a 
religious purpose. 
 
Scientific philosophy, as an essential activity, may be directed to a 
religious purpose. Tertullian, the Carthaginian theologian, who died 
circa 230, spoke of the “natural man,” simple, rude, uncultured, 
untaught, and not yet ruined by Greek education, as being anima 
naturaliter Christiana. Tertullian invited individuals to return to 
their own religious experience since it is prior to any independent 
thought or theory. In this they could explore their spiritual life in 
order to find the Christian route to God. An earlier philosophical 
thinker, Socrates, in his dialectical approach, desired to help clarify 
the thinking of poets, politicians and whomever he met in the market 
place both young and old. However, Socrates did not initiate a 
system of philosophy. Rather, he undertook a responsible approach 
to thinking. While it may be true that for many of our 
contemporaries God has died in the Western culture of the 
nineteenth century; God may yet return to our culture understood 
through the scientific use of new images and new symbols. 
Interpreting these new images and symbols is the task of scientific 
religious philosopher. But it is to be   remembered that the task of 
the scientific religious philosopher is temporary. It is temporary for 
the theologian also. Contemporary thinkers know, from their 
experience, that there is no final philosophy or theology. The work 
of the theologian today is conceived differently than in the days of 
the great theological systems. The contemporary task of the 
scientific religious philosopher is to make known the great abiding 
truths of rational belief to a new generation. The principle merit and 
usefulness of scientific religious philosophy, that is, of dehellenized 
philosophy in theological interpretation is to satisfy the expectation 











Eidos/essence: Eidos is Plato’s alternative term for Idea or Form that 
Edmund Husserl utilized to designate universal essences. Essence 
is that what makes a thing what it is and without which it would not 
be what it is. In Husserl’s writings essence often refers to the 
“whatness” of things, as opposed to their “thatness” (i.e., their 
existence). Phenomenological philosophers accept that the notion of 
essence is highly complex and that the early Husserlian view tended 
toward simplifying the search for essences in the writings of some 
of his followers. Essence is not a single, fixed property by which 
we know something; rather, it is meaning constituted by a complex 
array of aspects, properties and qualities. 
 
Holism: The term derives from the Greek, holos, meaning all, entire, 
total, and reflects the idea that all the properties of a given system 
(biological, chemical, social, economic, mental, linguistic, etc.) 
cannot be determined or explained by its component parts alone. 
Instead, the system as a whole determines in an important way how 
the parts behave. It is the doctrine that the identity of a subject is 
determined by its place in the web of beliefs comprising a whole 
theory or group of theories and maintains that the subject is greater 
than the sum of all its parts. Johan Christian Smuts coined the phrase 
in Holism and Evolution in 1927. 
 
Lebenswelt: This is one’s world that is characteristic of the pre- 
philosophical or un-differentiated world without particular themes 
and that is simply taken for granted. It is the familiar world in 
which humanity lives. However, when themes arise from the 
Umwelt through rational investigation, the Lebenswelt becomes 
reconstituted and becomes a world of essences, or an essential world. 
It is the world created by individuals even though they do not realize 
that they have done so. 
 
Phenomena: These presentations reveal nothing of the existence of 




Essences cannot be derived from appearances they can only be seen 
in the appearances. 
 
Philosophy: Intended by Edmund Husserl to develop the person or 
a community of persons. Ultimately, it is almost synonymous with 
“culture” whose purpose is to give a satisfactory answer to the 
problems of life. A new philosophy, determined by the problems of 
life to be solved, must be created. 
 
Praxis: This Greek term means conscious action or doing, unlike 
production that is aimed at some end or purpose. According to 
Aristotle actions are subject to moral valuation if they result from 
deliberate choice. 
 
Science: Edmund Husserl considers phenomenology as a science 
because it has disposed of contingency in its methodology. Hence, 
what is left is necessarily left to consciousness and can be known in 
no other way. 
 
Sensus fidelium: In the Catholic tradition this term refers to the 
“sense of the faithful,” the idea that beliefs, consciences and 
experiences of good and honest Catholics are among the 
manifestations of truth in Catholic theology. Thus, it something, 
which the hierarchy is to consult in making decisions about Catholic 
doctrine. Should Catholic laity dissent from the Catholic hierarchy, 
it may be that the laity is in fact following the correct and true 
Catholic understanding while the official hierarchy may be in error. 
 
Self: One’s self exists through a process of differentiation. As an 
agent the objective self is operative, materially composed and an 
existent. As a mind the subjective self is causally ineffective, 
immaterial and non-existent. 
 
Subjectivity: The high degree of subjectivity is what characterizes 
Edmund Husserl’s philosophy as new. The newness resulting from 




the thinker. The reduction to subjectivity cannot be accomplished 
once and for all: unless constantly forced to make this reduction, 
the human mind will follow its natural bent and become lost in 
objectivism. Edmund Husserl’s philosophy is a constant resistance 
to the mind’s natural tendency to go in a counter direction. 
 
Transcendental phenomenology: This is an activity on the part of 
the philosopher, with the understanding that, that the being given to 
consciousness is such that it is impossible for it to be given 
otherwise. 
 
Umwelt: Umwelt means the environment or surrounding world 
that is the biological foundation at the very epicenter 
communication and signification in the human and non-human 
animal. The German term is usually translated as “subjective 
universe.” Understood as the environing world it is not the objective 
world of familiar experience but the world constituted by the 
spiritual subject. Subjects can have different Umwelts, even 
though they share the same environment. 
 
Wholism: This term is not merely a variant spelling of “holism,” but 
the meaning is similar except for the understanding that the subject 
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BY THE SAME AUTHOR 
 
A Phenomenological Understanding of Certain Liturgical Texts: 
The Anglican Collects for Advent and the Roman Catholic Collects 
for Lent (2001) [University of America Press] 
 
This book examines the philosophical premises underlying the 
language used in liturgical prayers. Scholastic philosophy, the 
dominant philosophical perspective in the West, is no longer 
satisfactory for contemporary religious formulation. 
Phenomenological philosophy appears to be replacing scholastic 
philosophy in forming and understanding personal and communal 
religious beliefs. The Collects of the Anglican and Roman Catholic 
Eucharistic liturgies for Advent and Lent were examined, re-written 
and field tested. The focus group, for field- testing, was composed 
of individuals who formally engage in research into spirituality and 
religious experiences. A Phenomenological Understanding of 
Certain Liturgical Texts encourages further investigation into the 
growing use of phenomenology in liturgical understanding based on 
a discernible trend in this direction. 
 
Faith, Hope and Charity as Character Traits in Adler's Individual 
Psychology: With Related Essays in Spirituality and 
Phenomenology (2003) [University of America Press] 
 
(Co-author Sheldon William Nicholl) 
 
In Part One, Sheldon Nicholl offers an outline of Adler's life and the 
basics of his Individual Psychology. Allan Savage examines the 
relationship between Individual Psychology and Pastoral Theology. 
Special attention is given to the role of cognitive therapy. The 
cardinal virtues of faith, hope and charity are explored, in some 
detail, in the context of Adler's Individual Psychology. As character 
traits they are found to be in accord with the development of 
Adler's notion of Gemeinschaftsgefühl. Part Two is a compilation of 




section consists of a set of six exchanges between Erik Mansager 
and Allan Savage over the concept of "critical collaboration." Other 
previously published essays by Savage incorporate Adlerian 
themes. However, chapter eight is not specifically Adlerian in 
content. Since the root of Adler's Individual Psychology is 
anchored in German philosophical thought of the early 1900’s this 
chapter explores notions derived from the later Heidegger and the 
thought of Husserl. 
 
A Contemporary Understanding of Religious Belief within Mental 
Health (2007) [Melrose Books, UK] 
 
This short book suggests the need for psychiatrists to work with the 
knowledge of theology so that mentally ill patients who hold strong 
religious beliefs may receive appropriate treatment. The work is 
introduced by discussing the definition of mental illness, the 
meaning of religious belief in modern society and the view that 
psychiatry has of it. He states that ‘Theology can make a significant 
contribution to the integration of mental health and religious belief.’ 
Reverend Savage promotes the phenomenological approach to 
understanding religious belief, an approach that concentrates on the 
study of consciousness and the objects of direct experience. He 
claims that secularisation in modern society has caused ‘a fracture 
between religion and spirituality.’ He then discusses how society 
influences the form that religious belief takes and how it decides 
what is or what is not ‘normal.’ The author explains how psychiatry 
today is a combination of psychoanalysis and the chemical 
management of neurological processes. It is debatable whether 
general practitioners should prescribe antidepressants without prior 
consultation with a psychiatrist. The role of the psychiatrist seems 
to be diminishing, but ‘there is no question that for the near future 
the psychiatrist will remain a moral agent on behalf of the 
community’; a position that was traditionally held by priests. 
Reverend Savage writes in a very learned style and his book may be 





The Ecology: A "New to You" View - An Orthodox Theological 
Ecology (2008) [Artbookbindery.com] 
 
The ideas presented in this book, in fact, are not new. They 
represent problems arising from the new orientation of the Western 
World that followed the Great War of 1914-1918. Much 
contemporary theology still deals with issues that have been 
identified as “Modernism” by the ecclesiastical authorities of an 
earlier day. What is new in this book, however, is a 
phenomenological theological consideration in the context of a 
contemporary global ecology, and not in the context of the 
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